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For brevity Appellees Martin and Darlene Houck will not restate Appellants 
Jurisdiction, Issues Presented For Review, Determinative Statutes, Rules And 
Regulations, nor Statement of the Case as it pertains to nature of case and course of 
pleadings. .Appellees will address issues covered in the Statement Of Facts because 
Appellees disagree with these statements and feel that they should be clarified. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Numbers 1 through 5 will not be addressed. Beginning with Statement #6 which 
pertains to the property elevation difference: For clarification, Appellees Houck do not 
refute that elevation differences have existed but Appellants' property has a pile of 
manure on Appellants' side of the adjoining property line, which Appellants' have built 
up the height of since July 2004, but state that if their irrigation water management is 
done correctly flooding is not an issue. Water management is the clue to control the 
water shed between elevations. Appellees' property has had no Appellants' irrigation 
water on it since the July 2004 letter. R.545, 82: 12-25 R. 83: 1-2 R. 344 15 & 16. 
Statement #7: Appellants' statement that irrigation water on both properties flows 
from the South to the North, while this is true, Appellees property is located to the West 
of Appellants' property. 
Statement #8: Not addressing. 
Statement #9: Appellants' statement "despite the fact that is where the water 
flowed" 
Appellants' home is constructed on the North end of their property. Irrigation 
water on these properties does flow from the South to the North, however, Appellees 
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were not aware when they bought the property that Appellants' irrigation water flowed 
onto Appellees property in an east to west direction when their irrigation water was not 
managed correctly. Appellants' addressing in Statement #9 "the water", not Appellants' 
water. R. 550 & 551, 39: 1-25 & 42: 1-23 R. 606 20: 11-13 
Statement #10: Appellants' address a "further action" meaning in the July 8,2004 
letter as to imply the legal definition of these words. Appellees are not schooled in the 
legal profession, so, to imply that Appellees are applying that definition to those words is 
incorrect, Appellees, as stated in their depositions, did not intend the legal definition. 
R. 567 305: 9-14 R. 567 305: 9-14 R. 597 89: 20-25 R. 597 90: 1-8 
Statement #11: Appellants' state that an "effort to resolve it", Appellees statement 
is that if you call the two Appellants' exhibiting child like behaviors with Appellant 
Lewis only addressing what business Appellee Darlene had in writing the letter and 
Appellant Afton only expounding on the Appellants personal issues against Appellees 
and their property. Appellees do not consider Appellants' discourse as a "resolution". 
Neither Appellants', while at the Appellees' door, in their discourse, denied 
the flooding; in fact, Appellant Afton asked "what do you want us to do". Appellee 
Darlene response was to keep their water off of our property. 
Also in Statement #11, Appellants' further state that Appellants' were using 
profanity at Appellee Darlene. Appellees have never stated that Appellant Afton used 
profanity. 
R. 544 92: 11-25 R.570 282: 18-25 R.572 260: 5-11 R.572 262: 5-13 R.573 254: 13-16 
R.594 115: 1-25 R.594 116: 1-15 R.595 105: 16-25 R.595 106: 1-9 R. 596 102: 23-25 
2 
R. 596 103: 1-24R.597 95: 19-25 R. 597 98: 1-25 R.598 88: 18-25 R. 597 90:24 - 96: 
21 
Statement #12: If Appellant is addressing the Statement 11 incident in this 
statement regarding while Appellants' were at Appellees door, Appellants' never denied 
the flooding PERIOD. 
Statement #13 Not Addressing. 
Statement #14: Contrary to this statement about Appellees exhibiting great 
hostilities towards Appellants, Appellees have tolerated being flooded by Appellants' 
contaminated irrigation water throughout the years; never exhibiting anger or 
frustration towards Appellants. In fact, throughout both Appellees depositions we 
cited examples of being good neighbors . (R. 610 95:19) 
The great hostilities exhibited were Appellants' towards Appellees through the 
flagrant disregard of a neighbors property by the years of trespass by contaminated 
irrigation water, prohibiting Appellees from the normal use of their property, 
jeopardizing the health of the Appellees corralled animals along the Appellees easterly 
fenceline, plus the nuisance of having to work in wet conditions. (R. 556 93: 2-19) 
Subsequently to the July 2004 letter asking Appellants to discontinue the flooding 
Appellees have been subjected to years of threatening behavior exhibited at them by 
Appellant Lewis. These threatening behaviors necessitated that Appellees seek 
protection from local law enforcement in lieu of taking matters in their own hands. 
Appellees have had to endure the childish exhibition incident wherein Appellants' 
Lewis profane words and Appellant Afton threatening statement about making Lewis 
mad; that he never forgets; we have had threats of violence from Appellants' son 
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Nicholas; we have been denied access to irrigation water, the right to which we have 
been entitled to and have enjoyed during our ownership of this land, illegally denied us 
by Appellants' counsel (son) Jason. 
Except for one occasion (where Appellant Lewis appearing unexpectedly at the 
Appellees property taking pictures Appellee Martin did say a profane word to Appellant 
Lewis) Appellees have never reciprocated "in kind" to Appellants threats. 
Appellees can not go anywhere in this area without feeling the need to look over 
our shoulder to see where Appellants9 are lurking. Again, there have bee hostilities 
exhibited, but they have been Appellants' towards Appellees. 
R. 537 145: 13-15 R. 544 90: 23-25 91: 1-25 R. 545 82: 12-23, 85: 2- 86:19, 87: 19-25 
R. 547 72: 13-16 R. 548 59: 11-17 60: 1-24 R549 52: 22-24 R. 595 105: 16-18 R. 598 
85: 1-25 86:6-17R. 600 71: 21-24 
Statement #15: This May 12, 2006 incident did not happen as was stated. 
Appellee Martin's vehicle never entered Appellants' property. During an excess 
water incident Appellants' son Nicholas incited a verbal altercation with Appellee 
Martin; during the ongoing heated discussion, Appellant Afton came out of the 
house and joined in on the conversation. Appellees concur that the minor children, 
which Appellant Afton brought out of the house with her, should have not been 
subjected to the verbiage being expressed between the parties; Appellant Afton should 
never have brought children into that environment. 
It is Appellants' contention that this incident started between Appellant Afton and 
Appellee Martin, when in fact as our proof we cite all of the references below where 
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throughout the proceedings Appellants' counsel refer to the incident as to Appellants' 
son Nicholas and Appellee Martin, not Afton. Not until Appellant Afton's Affidavit and 
Appelant's son Nicholas' Affidavit did this event get changed as to it being between 
Appellant Afton and Appellee Martin. 
As for Appellants' Afton & Lewis Affidavits (857 866) and to Nicholas and Jason 
Pintar's Affidavits (851 1179), Appellees choose not to address "he said, she said" 
heresay, not proofs, extolled in their Affidavits. Appellees state that they strongly 
disagree with their perceptions and allegations, and it is unfortunate that they jeopardize 
their respective integrities by using this material. 
As for the Neeves Affidavit (845), Appellees feel that it is ambiguous and disagree 
with its contents. 
R. 519 264: 1-5 R. 541 113:1-25 114: 1-25 115: 1-25 116: 1-25 117: 1-25 
118: 1-25 119: 25 R. 542 111: 7-8 R. 543 99: 23-24 R. 570 276: 20-21 R. 572 
119:12-25 266:4-13 R. 586 183: 10-21 R. 589 158: 15-17 R. 590 149:8-11 
R. 592 129: 5-14 R. 593 121: 17-18 R. 851 2: 4 R. 857 4: 10 AlsoPg. 14 of 
Appellants' brief #19 R. 1292 16:10. 
Statement #16: Not Addressing 
Statement #17: Appellees did call Appellee Tonya Houck, who responded 
that Appellees should call Dispatch for help. 
Statement #18: Not Addressing 
Statement #19: Even though Appellant Lewis was not a party to this confortation, 
because of his previous threatening behaviors, Appellees developed anxieties in 
anticipation of a repeat of Appellants' overreaction again. Appellees would like to 
point out again Appellants' reference to the confortation as being between 
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Nicholas and Martin, not Afton and Martin. 
Statement #20: We can not speak for the actions of Deputy Morgan. 
Statement #21; Appellees strongly refute the Appellant Afton's denial 
of the "monkeys" incident. Appellees hold steadfast to their story that this 
"monkeys'" occurrence did happen. R. 589 153: 1-25 154:1-25 155: 1-25 156:1-25 
R. 538 137: 2-25 138:1-12 
Statement #22: Regarding the "flag rising ceremony" Appellees stand firm on 
their statements that this event did take place. R. 588 158: 24 thru 166: 10 R.538 
138: 13 thru 142: 25 
Statement #23: Appellants' comment in this statement as to when the incident 
took place is ambiguous, as there were several incidences of Marty being 
"flipped off by Appellant Lewis after the July 2004 letter. 
Statement #24: Appellees can not speaJc for Deputy Morgan, 
Statement #25: Appellants' Brief, page 5, "i" stipulates threatening behavior 
as a determinative statute. Subsequent to the July 2004 letter from Appellants' to 
Appellees, the crux of Appellant Lewis' behavior has been one of threatening, as have 
the aforementioned Afton, Nicholas and Jason Pintars threats. 
Statements 26, 27 & 28 are part of the records. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court correctly ruled that Deputy Morgan was not a policy maker for 
Utah County and in the absence of evidence that Deputy Morgans' actions constituted 
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official policy, also that her decisions were reviewed and ratified by those having 
official policy making authority; the Appellants did not bring forth any allegations 
that official Utah County policy was unconstitutional, and Appellants inability to 
state which claims could relief be granted upon, were the courts' findings with regard to 
arguments # 1 and 2. 
Regarding the Second Amended Complaint filing attempt, because of discovery 
timing issues which we have spelled out; the fact that the proposed additional language 
would have altered the landscape of the original complaint; because Appellants knew of 
the proposed facts at the time that the original complaint was filed, or shortly thereafter, 
the proposed amendment should have been brought sooner; that the Appellees discovery 
was considered closed it was inappropriate to add new issues; Appellants did not offer 
any more specifics and instead simply relied on overboard, conclusory allegations which 
are simply not enough to sustain this cause of action, therefore, the Court denied this 
filing attempt. 
Regarding the declaratory relief as to the Houcks: Under this request Appellants 
contend that they should maintain the right to continue irrigating their property as they 
have traditionally done, requesting the court to grant them the right for any run over 
onto Appellees property to be legal; and if it happens so be it, any defensive methods 
to withhold the runoff water is the obligation of the Appellees to undertake. Appelants 
must use reasonable care in the use of their wate so as not to damage the property of 
their neighbors. 
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There is ambiguity in the declaratory request, Appellants did not state what 
"matters" were to be addressed in a declaratory judgment. 
Appellants can not deny Appellees their right to receive irrigation water from 
Westfield Irrigation Company irregardless of whether it is a regular or excess water 
turn, nor whether it is appropriated or not. The water company board is the governing 
body on these issues and have already taken care of this matter. 
Finally, the alleged pipe installation obstruction in a drain ditch is a cause of 
action that is totally unrelated to the facts pled in the original complaint. 
As for the conspiracy and malicious prosecution claims: the facts were not pled 
with specificity; that there was no proof of an agreement or concerted action among 
defendants; that there was nothing more than conclusory allegations of conspiracy; 
that a single defendant can not conspire alone, how can you have a meeting of the 
minds between two, shy of being complete strangers, persons (between Utah County 
employees). 
Appellees would like to now address the ARGUMENTS which were entered on 
Appellants' brief. 
L THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEPUTY MORGAN 
IS NOT A POLICYMAKER FOR UTAH COUNTYAND THEREFORE 
LIABILITY CANNOT ATTACH TO UTAH COUNTY, 
In Judge Stott's August 20, 2008 Memorandum Decision (R. 200-202) 
"Plaintiffs have brought forth no allegations that official Utah County policy was 
unconstitutional." 
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In this same Memorandum (R. 203), Judge Stott states: 
"Plaintiffs Notice of Claim was filed prematurely, did not 
adequately identify the nature of the claims asserted, 
and the time to file a proper Notice of Claim has expired. 
On Judge Stotf s Order Dismissing Utah County Defendants (R 215, 216) 
"....nor can Utah County be held liable for Section 1983 claims 
under a theory of respondeat superior....99 
"Plaintiffs brought claims for malicious prosecution and 
conspiracy under 42 § U.S.C. 1983 against Utah County 
Defendants. These claims are dismissed for failure to 
State a claim for which relief can be granted, pursuant to 
UtahR.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)" 
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEPUTY MORGAN IS 
ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM THE PINTARS' SECOND 
AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION (MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND 
CONSPIRACY PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C § 1983) 
Also in Judge Stotf s August 20, 2008 Memorandum Decision (R. 203) 
Utah County Defendants may claim relief under qualified immunity for discretionary 
actions when the officers did not clearly know their actions were violative of the law, 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Section 1983 Claims must therefore be granted." 
(R. 216) "To summarize, Plaintiffs complaint against Deputy Morgan and 
Tonya Houck was filed prematurely, the notice of claim did not adequately identify the 
nature of the claims asserted, and the time to file a proper Notice Of Claim has expired. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs' state law claims against Utah County Defendants are forever 
barred." 
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"The Court GRANTS Utah County Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiffs 
Section 1983 claims, with prejudice, for the following reasons: 
Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan are entitled to qualified 
immunity. Under the established qualified immunity framework, 
Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that Tonya Houck and Deputy 
Morgan violated Mr. Pintar's constitutional rights that were clearly 
established such that a reasonable officer would know that the 
conduct engaged in by them was clearly unlawful,...The fact that 
the charges against Mr. Pintar later turned out to be 
unsubstantiated does not make Tonya Houck's and Deputy 
Morgan's actions unreasonable in light of the circumstances 
prevailing at the time" (R.214). 
(R200) ..." Plaintiffs have brought forth no allegations that official Utah County 
policy was unconstitutional, and in the absence of evidence that Deputy Morgans' actions 
constituted official policy, or that her decisions were reviewed and ratified by those 
having official policy making authority, the PlaintifFs claim against the Defendants' for a 
Section 1983 violation cannot stand." 
Ill THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE 
PINTARS LEAVE TO FILE THEIR SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
(R. 442) Plaintiffs seek to add two new causes of action (Second and Third Causes 
of Action) and to "adequately plead the other causes of action stated in the original 
Complaint" which are unrelated to the arrest incident. (See Plaintiffs' Supporting 
Memorandum, 3:1). Plaintiffs knew of the additional facts and claims alleged prior to 
filing the first Complaint on November 1, 2007. With respect to the First and Third 
Causes of Action, and knew of the facts alleged in the Second Cause of Action on May 
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15, 2008. Plaintiffs argue that they were unable to move to amend their Complaint until 
two months before the fact discovery deadline between the first year of this lawsuit 
was focused on motions to dismiss the Utah County Defendants. These Motions did not 
involve the Houcks. Plaintiffs argue that the other reason they were unable to move to 
amend their Complaint is that the Houcks filed a complaint with the Utah State Bar 
against Plaintiffs' attorney during a time when the Houcks were unrepresented by 
counsel. Plaintiffs counsel did not ask the Court for a stay of the proceedings and it was 
not a situation where counsel's own clients filed a bar complaint which would possibly 
prohibit counsel from continuing with this lawsuit." 
(R. 441) Finally, in addition to the new facts and causes of action being unrelated 
to the original Complaint, Plaintiffs seek the following: 1) to have the Court declare that 
it is legal for Plaintiffs' to flood Defendants' property (First Cause Of Action); 2) to have 
the Court rule on an issue concerning the use of excess water which has already been 
decided by the Westfield Irrigation Board and which issue properly belongs before the 
Board (Second Cause of Action); and 3)specific performance relating to a drainage ditch 
and pipe installed by the Houcks in that ditch (Third Cause Of Action). R 774 pg 11. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE DENIED TO LEAVE TO AMEND THEIR 
COMPLAINT. 
Rule 15 states that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. Utah R.Civ.P. 15 (a) The factors the Court should consider in deciding whether 
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to allow amendment of pleadings include (1) whether the movant was aware of the facts 
underlying the proposed amendment long before its filing; (2) the timeliness of the 
motion; (3) the justification for the delay; and (4) any resulting prejudice to the 
responding party. Jones v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 2003 UT App 355, f 16, 78 P3d 
988 (citations omitted). While the motion to amend analysis is a multi-factored, flexible 
inquiry that allows trial courts the leeway to evaluate the factual circumstances and legal 
developments involved in each particular case, the circumstances of a particular case may 
be such that a court's ruling on a motion to amend a pleading can be predicated on only 
one or two of the particular factors. Kelly v. Hard Money Money, Inc., 2004 UT App, f^ [ 
41-42, 87 P. 3d 734. The Court is not limited to these factors in making a determination 
whether to grant or deny motions to amend pleadings. Id. At ^ 41-42." 
(R.440) Discussed below are the reasons why the Court should deny Plaintiffs' 
motion to amend their Complaint. 
A. Plaintiffs' Reasons for the Delay in Seeking Leave to 
Amend Complaint are Unjustified. 
Plaintiffs give two reasons to justify their delay in moving to amend their 
Complaint. First, Plaintiffs state that in 2008 the litigation was concentrated on the 
defendants who have since been dismissed (Utah County, Tonya Houck, Sandra Morgan, 
Kay Bryson, and Timothy Barnes) and that is why Plaintiffs were unable to move to 
amend their Complaint sooner. See Plaintiffs9 Memorandum, 3:24-29. What essentially 
transpired was the briefing on two motions to dismiss filed by those defendants and a 
motion for bifurcation. The motions were heard on June 17, 2008 and were subsequently 
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granted, and the motion for bifurcation was denied as moot Plaintiffs then sought to 
appeal the decision and the appeal was dismissed on summary disposition in December 
2008. This is not a valid reason for Plaintiffs' delay in seeking to amend their Complaint 
with regard to claims against Martin and Darlene Houck because Martin and Darlene 
Houck were not involved in those motions or in the appeal. It certainly was not a 
situation where the amendment of the Complaint might depend on the outcome of the 
motions to dismiss or on some discovery that was being conducted. In fact, there was not 
even an attorneys' planning meeting or scheduling order entered in this case until April 
2009 after current counsel entered her appearance. 
The second reason Plaintiffs give to justify their delay is that Darlene Houck filed 
complaint with the Utah State Bar against plaintiffs' counsel during a time when she was 
unrepresented by counsel. Plaintiffs' state that "...the litigation was stopped dead in its 
tracks... The Complaint was meritless*....Plaintiffs' counsel was so advised not to 
(R.439) proceed further with the litigation until the bar complaint matter was cleared up." 
Plaintiffs' Supporting Memorandum, 3:29 - 4:4. This excuse is likewise not a valid 
reason for delay. The Houck's former attorney withdrew his representation in January 
2009 so there was a period of time when the Houcks were without representation. On 
February 23, 2009, Plaintiffs' attorney (and son), Jason Pintar, sent the Houcks a letter 
essentially threatening them, among other things, not to bring their water dispute to the 
Westfield Irrigation Board or Mr. Pintar would add more counts of defamation to the 
lawsuit. (R 428 & R.427). The Houcks, still unrepresented by counsel, filed a complaint 
against Mr. Pintar with the Utah State Bar Office Of Professional Conduct ("Bar 
13 
Complaint"). Although Mr. Pintar represents to this Court that the Bar Complaint was 
meritless, the Office found otherwise, even though the Bar Complaint was dismissed on 
other grounds, R.583 208:18 R. 582 209: 2, and R. 582 211:18 R.582 212:3. Mr. Pintar 
also represents, in his Reply Brief Re: Pretrial Scheduling Conference at 2:25-26, that 
he was "ordered to halt all work on this case..." It is apparent that "order" did not come 
from this Court. Mr. Pintar could also have asked the Court to stay these proceedings but 
he did not and continued to actively participate in this case during the time that 4Cthe 
litigation was stopped dead in its tracks". Since the Bar Complaint was not filed by Mr. 
Pintar's client, there is no justifiable reason for Mr. Pintar to blame the Bar Complaint for 
his delay in seeking to amend the Complaint." 
(R. 438) Plaintiffs' two reasons for the delay in seeking to amend the Complaint 
(1) concentrating on one group of defendants by opposing motions to dismiss which did 
not involve the Houcks, and (2) that a Bar Complaint was filed against him by someone 
who was not his client, do not provide sufficient justification for any delay in seeking to 
amend the Complaint a second time. 
B The Houcks Would Be Prejudiced If the Court Allowed 
Plaintiffs Leave To Amend Their Complaint 
Plaintiffs inaccurately state that "the additional language that Plaintiff proposes to 
add to the Complaint do not alter the landscape in any way." Plaintiffs' Supporting 
Memorandum, 5:9-10. As argued throughout this brief, Plaintiffs seek to bring two 
causes of (R. 437) action and plead numerous additional facts that are unrelated to their 
original Complaint. On the January 19, 2010 Oral Arguments Transcript, pg. 15: line 6-
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12, Judge Mortensen stated: "I've considered all of the arguments here and I do 
understand that -and—but I believe it's accurate that Mr. Pintar's argument is that a 
multiplicity of litigation is typically to be avoided; however, given the current status of 
this case and the plaintiffs' position that discovery has closed, the Court is going to deny 
the motion for an amendment...." (lines 17-21): 
Also on 1295 transcript: Pg. 9, line 24 - Pg. 10: 1-13 "...I just wanted to verify. 
The assertion was made in the defendant's memoranda that there are no facts in the 
amended complaint that were only recently discovered, those were all known at the time 
of the original complaint; is that true? Mr. Pintar: With - no, it's not. With regard to 
the- with the cause of action for specific performance that has to do with the obstruction 
that was put in the drainage ditch. The discovery of the damage that that has been 
causing has only happened within late 2008 and 2009, which is after the complaint was 
filed. With regard to the controversy that's arisen with putting a lock on a head gate, that 
occurred on or about May of 2008, which again, the—the original complaint was filed in 
November Of'07." 
In the March 26, 2010 Telephone Conference (1293), pg. 5: 20-23 "I already 
mentioned this in oral arguments, the second amended complaint was - the motion to 
amend to allow the second amended complaint was denied, therefore, the second 
amended complaint is not a pleading before the Court, because I didn't allow it." 
In the June 28, 2010 Motion For Summary Judgment (1294), pg. 52:2-5, "... I 
hope I've communicated that for purposes of this case, we're not amending. And so, 
we're going to take care of what's been pled in this complaint, in this action." In May 7, 
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2010 Memorandum Decision, (1267) "More importantly, in this case this court denied the 
motion to allow the second amended complaint. Accordingly, the second amended 
complaint has never become operative in this case." 
"I find that the facts, if not known at the time the complaint was filed, were known 
relatively shortly thereafter so that an amendment could have been brought far sooner. 
Again, because the discovery is going to be considered closed, I think it would be 
inappropriate to grant the amendment." 
II THE MOST IMPORTANT REASON TO DENY PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO AMEND IS FUTILITY. 
A Court should deny motions to amend when the moving party seeks to assert a 
new claim that is legally insufficient or futile. Tretheway v. Furstenau, 2001 UT App 
400, U 19, 40 P.3d 649 (citations omitted). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS' 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AS TO 
THE HOUCKS. 
First Cause of Action (Declaratory Judgment) 
.In the original Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that the Houcks falsely asserted that 
Plaintiffs had improperly managed their irrigation water causing flooding to the Houcks' 
property, the source of the Houcks' allegation is a letter sent by Mr. Houck to Mr. Pintar, 
dated July 23, 2004 In (1293) Line 21, "...If our - we want to go back to what we 
traditionally did and if it incidentally sends the water on the Houck property, so be it." 
(R. 947) Plaintiffs also allege that the reason the Houcks' property was flooded with 
Plaintiffs' irrigation water is the Houcks' failure to comply with the established 
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procedures of the water company. Complaint dated November 1, 2009, If 14. R. 775, R. 
776. R.780, pg 5: # 9: In the proposed Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs have 
revised the facts concerning their declaratory judgment request and state the following: 
"Plaintiffs request that this Court declare pursuant to applicable statute and common law 
that Plaintiffs have the right to reasonably irrigate their property, and given the facts and 
circumstances herein, if any water runs onto Defendants' property as a result of 
Plaintiffs' reasonable irrigation of their property, said water running over is legal 
and therefore not actionable by Defendants" . # 10 Plaintiffs have also changed their 
claim that the Houcks "falsely alleged flooding to their property" as alleged in the 
original Complaint to the "false assertion that Plaintiffs improperly and irresponsibly 
irrigated their property." Proposed Second Amended Complaint fl46.' #11: Most 
importantly. Plaintiffs no longer claim that the Houcks falsely asserted, in the July 8, 
2004 letter, that the Pintars' irrigation water flooded their Property. See proposed Second 
Amended Complaint." Based on the alleged misperceptions of the Houcks regarding the 
flooding of their property by the Pintars, Plaintiffs proceed to outline facts about a 
conspiracy among the Houcks, their daughter-in-law Tonya Houck who is employed as a 
secretary at the Utah County Sheriffs Department, and Deputy Sandra Morgan to have 
Mr. Pintar arrested for disorderly conduct complaint dated (R. 436) November 1, 2009, 
Hf 15-16. The remaining facts flflf 17-32) Concern allegations about how Deputy Morgan 
and the other Utah County Defendants violated Mr. Pintar's civil right and maliciously 
prosecuted Mr. Pintar, based on the alleged conspiracy with the Houcks. The First Cause 
of Action is a request for declaratory judgment concerning the "determination of this 
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Court declaring the respective rights, status and legal relationship between the parties 
based upon statutes, ordinances, irrigation water stock, deeds, prior precedence, and 
related matters affecting their duties and responsibilities" Complaint dated November 1, 
2009, f 35. Plaintiffs do not offer any more specifics and instead simply rely on 
overboard, conclusory allegations which are simply not enough to sustain this cause of 
action. With regard to damages, Plaintiffs allege that as a result of the Houcks' alleged 
misrepresentations stemming from the 2004 letter; they were forced to build a dike along 
the field where the flooding took place to placate the Houcks. Complaint dated 
November 1,2009,1f70. 
Now, Plaintiffs propose to amend the First Cause of Action "specifically" to ask 
the Court to "declare pursuant to applicable statute and common law that Plaintiffs have 
the right to reasonably irrigate their property, and given the facts and circumstances 
herein, if any water runs onto Defendants'... property as a result of Plaintiffs' reasonable 
irrigation of their property, said water running over is legal and therefore not actionable 
by Defendants." Proposed Amended Complaint, Tf 70. In the Memorandum Decision, 
May 7, 2010, (1265 & 1266): "Both Wayment and gardner address an appropriator's 
right to continue use of a method of diversion. Diversion of water is not synonymous 
with use of water. Diversion of water describes the method by which a water right holder 
gets water to his property. Diversion of water does not describe anything concerning the 
control of water onto property of others. The Wayment court did discuss a right to 
continued historical use of water, but in no way does that case address the issues 
presented her^. On the other hand, Utah law does address the issues presented here. In 
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fact, a case identified by the Plaintiff at oral argument sets out some principles. In 
Sanford v. University of Utah 488 P.2d 741, 744 (Utah 1971), the court acknowledged 
doctrine of reasonable use for the discharge of surface waters. The Sanford court stated: 
An unjustified invasion of a possessor's interest in 
the use and enjoyment of his land through the 
medium of surface waters is as much a tort as a 
trespass or private nuisance produced by smoke or 
smells. Nevertheless, the courts and writers seldom 
analyzed the problems in terms of tortuous conduct, 
causation or other tort concepts. 
Id. (quoting Kinyon & McClure, Interference with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. 
L. REV. 891, 936 (1940) 
In Sanford the court adopted the Restatement (second) of Torts § 833: Non-
trespassory invasions of a person's interest in the use and enjoyment of land resulting 
from another's interference with the flow of surface water are governed by the rule stated 
in §§ 822-831 Thus, in later cases the reasonable use doctrine was applied even in the 
face of statutory mandate. The Utah Supreme Court in Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 
371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972) noted that Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 provide: "The owner of 
any ditch .. .or other watercourse shall maintain the same in repair so as to prevent waste 
of water or damage to the property of others... The court in Erickson noted : 
Notwithstanding the mandatory sound of the emphasized 
words of that statute, it is our established law that users of 
irrigation waters are not insurers against damages they may 
cause. They are held only to the standard of care that is 
generally applied import law; that which persons of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence would observe under the 
particular circumstances. 
19 
This is not so different than the law provided in Provo City Ordinance 10.05.030 which 
provides: 
(1) Persons using water for irrigation within the limits 
of the City shall be required to control all the water 
distributed to them, and shall be liable for all damages 
caused by their neglect 
(3) It shall be unlawful for any person, so using or 
conducting such water, to permit the same to flood 
the street, sidewalks or private property or to run to 
unnecessary waste (.) 
The court, of course, is not relying on this provision, but only notes its consistency 
with st^te law already established. Erickson, 28 Utah 2d at 373-74. Therefore, Utah law 
provides that the Pintars must use reasonable care in the use of their water so as not to 
damage the property of their neighbors. 
In the Telehone Conference (1293 ), dated March 26, 2010, pg. 9, line 20 - Pg. 10, 
line 8: ".. .we're stipulating that this water has traveled, it's been, for the purposes of the 
motion, we're going to assume that it was properly and reasonably diverted in a quantity 
that did not exceed their rights with the irrigation canal company and that it incidentally 
flowed downhill onto the Houcks' property and what the declaratory judgment action is 
seeking is a declaration from the Court that if that happens, there cannot be liability to the 
Pintars and if - if a party is supposed to do something about it, the onus is on Houcks to 
do something, create a berm or other obstacle so that the flooding does not occur. Is that 
right Mr. Pintar? Mr Pintar: Yes, your Honor. 
Iji the original Complaint, as noted above, Plaintiffs allege that the Houcks falsely 
accused Plaintiffs of flooding their property with irrigation water. Now Plaintiffs want to 
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amend the Complaint to ask the Court to declare that the Plaintiffs have the right to flood 
the Houcks' property. Plaintiffs offer no legal support for the outlandish proposition that 
(R. 435). Plaintiffs should be allowed to flood the Houcks9 property with their irrigation 
water, which will damage the Houcks' corrals and their livestock, instead of containing 
the water on their own property. 
In 1268 : " As stated in a supplemental telephonic hearing this Court attempted to 
perform its duty by asking plaintiffs9 counsel exactly what declaratory relief was being 
sought. In response to this questioning, it appears that plaintiffs1" seek a declaratory 
judgment specifically that they are entitled under the law to allow their irrigation water to 
run onto the defendants' property. The problem with plaintiffs assertion is that such a 
conclusion is not supported by Utah law." (1263) "The Houcks are under no duty to 
perform any act or effort to keep water from running onto their property." 
(1264): "Utah law likewise answers the question as to whether a person is under a 
duty to protect their private property from surface water running onto it. In Reeder 
v.Brigham City, supra, the court stated: "(The adjoining landowner) has the right to be 
free from receiving waters on his lands to his damage which do not find their way in their 
natural course and under natural conditions." 
In {1269): "The complaint upon close review does not indicate exactly what a 
bona fide dispute is, nor what "matters" are to be addressed in a declaratory judgment 
action. Para^aph 36 comes closer than any other paragraph, not seeking a declaratory 
judgment as to the Plaintiffs rights or duties, but only seeking new declaratory judgment 
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adjudicating the specific responsibilities and duties to "Defendants Martin and Darlene 
Houck" regarding the use and management of irrigation water between the properties." 
(1293) pg. 4—7, addresses the Plaintiffs' intention for declaratory judgment ruling 
on the right to water our property in the same manner as we have for decades of usage.... 
And if that incidentally puts water onto the Houck property, then you want a declaration 
that you can't be liable for that. Mr. Pintar "Correct". And are you seeking a declaration 
that if the Houcks don't like it, they need to do something about it? Mr. Pintar 
"Correct". 
Second Cause Of Action (Declaratory Judgment). 
Next, Plaintiff wants to insert another declaratory judgment action unrelated to the 
facts pled in the original Complaint "The power of the court to permit an amendment of 
pleadings does not extend so far as to permit the importation of an entirely new and 
different cause of action". Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.v. Clegg 135 P.2d 919, 
922-23 (Utah 1943); see also Crane v. Crane, 131 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Utah 1942) (a new 
and different cause of action cannot be injected under the guise of an amendment to a 
complaint). Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action asks the Court to declare that the Houcks 
have no right to flow unappropriated water across the Pintars' property and that Plaintiffs 
have the right to block the flow of that water. Proposed Amended Complaint, Tflf 52-54. 
Plaintiffs have not presented the entire picture concerning this issue. 
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The headgate referred to by Plaintiffs, which is believed to be located on the LDS 
Church property, allows unappropriated excess water to flow through the Westfield 
Irrigation Company supply ditch running east to west at the south end of the properties 
owned by the Pintars, the Binks, and the Houcks, in that order. Plaintiff Lewis Pintar 
had placed a lock on the headgate, at the direction of his attorney and in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-1-14, to prevent the Houcks from taking the excess water down the 
ditch. This issue appropriately belongs before the Westfield Irrigation board and in 
fact, was resolved by the Westfield Irrigation Board on May 15, 2008. 
(R. 434) which mentioned a confrontation that consisted of a locked head gate and 
refusing to let others water. Excess water must be treated the same as a regular turn. The 
water master has to be the mediator ... the shareholders have the right to excess water but 
they must contact the water master prior to use of it No one has the right to stop 
someone else from watering. A locked head gate is obstruction. The Board further 
clarified the issue on February 4,2009: 
Other business brought before the board was the 
concern of the excess water running down the 
ditch unassigned and who is entitled to use the 
water.. .Policy for this water is to obtain approval 
through the water master prior to use of it. 
In the Spanish Fork Westfield Irrigation Company, Board Of Directors minutes, 
dated February 4, 2009, the Westfield Irrigation Board has established procedures for 
accessing the water that Plaintiffs complain runs through the ditch in front of their 
property and in front of the Binks property and the Houck property. This issue has been 
resolved by the Westfield Irrigation Board and in the event any further such issues arise, 
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the appropriate course of action is for Plaintiffs to contact the Westfield Irrigation Board, 
not seek a declaratory judgment from the Court. (R. 594 120:11-25). 
(1267).. .within the purview of rule 56(d) this court has attempted to narrow some 
of the issues presented by the declaratory judgment action. First, Westfield Irrigation 
Company is not a party to this matter. As a result, any judgment of this court cannot as a 
matter of law adjudicate any duties or obligations of Westfield Irrigation Company. The 
only rights which can be adjudicated are those between the Pintars and the Houcks. 
(1268) The parties acknowledged and agreed in the telephonic hearing that there 
were no factual disputes pertinent to the declaratory judgment. Thus, the only question 
remaining is whether the declaratory relief sought is legally sustainable. The court 
concludes that it is not. 
(1269) In sum, Plaintiffs should not be allowed to amend Complaint to Include this 
cause of action because (1) it is unrelated to the original Complaint; (2) the matter has 
been resolved by the irrigation board; (3) the water master and the irrigation board are 
best suited and with authority to resolve any disputed over the use of that water; and (4) 
other parties whose rights would be affected, such as the Westfield Irrigation Company, 
the Binks, and potentially the LDS Church, will need to be (R. 433) brought into the 
lawsuit since any issue concerning the headgate and the flow of water will affect their 
rights as well. 
Third Cause of Action (Specific Performance). 
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In their Third (and entirely new) Cause of Action, Plaintiffs seek to bring claims 
against the Houcks concerning the alleged obstruction of a drain ditch which runs east to 
west along 4780 South on the northern boundary of the properties belonging to the 
Houcks, the Pintars, and the Roaches. Plaintiffs allege that the drainage pipe which the 
Houcks installed subsequent to the purchase of their property in 1991 is too small and is 
the main source of alleged problems concerning the ditch. Plaintiffs should not be 
allowed to amend their Complaint to include this cause of action because the original 
Complaint has no references whatsoever to this cause of action or any facts concerning 
this cause of action. As noted above, and supported by Hartford and Crane, Plaintiffs 
should not be allowed to add a cause of action that is totally unrelated to the facts pled in 
the original Complaint. 
II. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND IS UNTIMELY 
In Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Company, 854 P.2d 1025 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), 
the appeals court affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant leave to amend their 
complaint. "An amendment would certainly have delayed the trial and the substance of 
plaintiffs new allegation was known a full year earlier..." Id. At 1028. The motion to 
amend came at approximately the same time defendant moved for summary judgment. Id. 
at 1027. 
With respect to the First Cause of Action, Plaintiffs knew of the additional facts 
alleged prior to filing their original Complaint on November 1, 2007. In Fact, the 
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flooding incident complained of took place sometime in July, 2004 as well as in earlier 
years. (R.432) Yet Plaintiffs waited more than five years after incident and two years 
since the original Complaint was filed to seek amendment of their Complaint. 
With respect to the Second Cause of Action concerning the headgate issue, that 
issue was resolved by the Westfield Irrigation Board on May 15, 2008. At that time, 
Plaintiffs knew of the facts they now allege but waited a year and a half later to ask the 
Court for a declaratory judgment on an issue that had already been resolved. 
With respect to the Third Cause of Action concerning specific performance, 
Plaintiffs allege a cause of action for specific performance concerning a pipe installed by 
the Houcks in a drain ditch. Plaintiffs allege that the pipe was installed after the Houcks 
purchased the property in 1991. Mr. Houck acknowledges in his deposition that the 
changes to the drainage ditch were made "less than five years ago." Therefore, the time 
frame extends from after 1991 when the Houcks purchased their property to around late 
2002 or shortly thereafter, when the pipe was purchased and then installed. These events 
took place several years prior to filing the original Complaint. Again, Plaintiffs knew of 
these alleged problems at least at the time they filed their original Complaint but failed to 
plead those facts or bring the Third Cause of Action until now. Houcks had no prior 
knowledge of an obstruction in the ditch nor about any alleged Pintar property flooding 
until this allegation was filed in the Second Amended Complaint. 
V & VI THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PINTARS' 
THIRD AND FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION FOR CONSPIRACY 
PURSUANT TO TITLE 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AND CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
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AS TO THE HOUCKS AND THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION ...AS TO THE HOUCKS' 
(R. 773) Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action alleges malicious prosecution under 
Section 1983 for the proceedings stemming from Mr. Pintar^s booking for disorderly 
conduct, which Plaintiffs allege were instituted and maintained in the absence of probable 
cause. Tied in with the malicious prosecution claim are Plaintiffs' claims of negligent and 
intentional misrepresentation concerning information they provided to Deputy Morgan. 
Deputy Morgan investigated their complaints about the Pintars based on her judgment, 
issued a disorderly conduct citation to Mr. Pintar. Deputy Morgan then turned the matter 
over to the Utah County Attorney's Office...Plaintiffs maintain that the Houcks, private 
individuals, acted in concert with state actors to prosecute Mr. Pintar by supplying them 
with false information However, reporting perceived criminal activity alone does not 
show that an individual assisted in bringing a criminal charge when the responding 
officer subsequently brings such charges. Smith v. Colorado Sears Roebuck, 21 Fed. 
Appx. 796, 801 (10th Cir. 2001). 
Moreover, when a plaintiff attempts to assert the state action required for a 
Section 1983 claim against private actors based on a conspiracy with government actors, 
"mere conclusory (R.772) allegations with no supporting factual averments are 
insufficient" Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1073 (10th Cir. 2005) ^citations omitted). 
Rather, the plaintiff must specifically plead "facts tending to show agreement and 
concerted action." Id. 
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(R.772) The basis for Plaintiffs' Second, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action 
(Section 1983 claims of malicious prosecution and conspiracy, and state law claim of 
conspiracy) relies on Plaintiffs' assertion that the Houcks acted with the Utah County 
Defendants to falsely charge Mr. Pintar with disorderly conduct. Plaintiffs' allegations 
rest on the alleged "friendship" between Deputy Susan Morgan who investigated the 
Houcks' complaint and with Tonya Houck, the Houcks^ daughter-in-law who is 
employed as a secretary with the Utah County Sheriffs Office. (780) "... Plaintiffs' 
allege that Defendant Susan Morgan, a Deputy Utah County Sheriff, had a personal and 
friendly working relationship with Defendant, Tonya Houck, who was employed at the 
Utah County Sheriffs Office and who is also the Houcks' daughter-in-law Complaint, 
Tfl6. This allegation, that forms the basis for the Second, Third and Fourth Causes of 
Action, has been proven untrue. In the depositions of Susan Morgan (R. 688) 26: 13-25 
& 18-25 and Tonya Houck, (R.715) 33:22- 34: 3 & 34: 25-35:2 & 49 14-21 both women 
testified that there was no friendship, and that they did not even know each other. Thus, 
there could not have been a conspiracy between the Houcks and these women to bring 
charges against Mr. Pintar. Further, all state actors have been dismissed from the lawsuit 
and the Houcks are not state actors. (1294) 39: 21-25: Pintar states: 
" Because a close relative that works at the Sheriffs Department, the sheriff shows 
up and says, hey, we Have a close relative that works here, okay, WINK, WINK, I'll 
take care of you. Okay? That's our argument. And that's the fact that we - based on 
those facts , its perfectly—." 
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To sustain a conspiracy claim under Section 1983, a Plaintiff must allege specific 
facts showing an agreement and concerted action among defendants. Cardoso v. Calbone, 
490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir.2007) (citing Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents. 159 
F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998)). Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to 
state a valid Section 1983 claim. Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 
533 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994) 
Reporting perceived criminal activity alone does (R. 771) not show that an individual 
assisted an officer in bringing a criminal charge when the responding officer 
subsequently brings such charges. Smith v. Colorado Sears Roebuck, 21 Fed. Appx.796, 
801 (10th Cir. 2001). 
As with the malicious prosecution claim Plaintiffs present us with nothing more 
than conclusory allegations of conspiracy based on the following facts concerning Tonya 
Houck: (1) Ms. Houck is employed as a secretary in the Judicial Services Division of the 
Utah County Sheriffs Office; (2) Ms. Houck happens to be the daughter- In-law of 
codefendants Darlene and Martin Houck; and (3) Ms. Houck has an alleged friendship 
with Deputy Morgan. (Complaint, 1f 16) The testimony given by Tonya Houck and 
Deputy Morgan in their respective depositions show that none of these allegations are 
true and Plaintiffs have no proof of a concerted agreement and action among the other 
Utah County Defendants rising to the level of a conspiracy under Section 1983. A single 
defendant or in this case, the Houcks, by definition, cannot conspire alone. Further, since 
the Court agreed to dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 malicious prosecution claims, then 
there is no claim of a civil rights violation to which a conspiracy claim under Section 
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1983 can attach. See Cline II v. State of Utah 142 P.3 127m 136 (Utah App. 2005). 
Therefore, the Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution and conspiracy, as well as 
the civil conspiracy claim rightfully so were dismissed. 
(R. 1262)... Defendants argue that the crux of the plaintiffs5 argument is the alleged 
relationship between Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck and that plaintiffs have not 
forwarded any evidence that these individuals knew each other beyond having heard one 
another's names. This Court concurs and finds that the plaintiffs' facts do not support a 
claim for conspiracy and that claim fails as a matter of law. 
(R. 1261) To support a cause of action for Section 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff 
must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among the 
defendants. Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Tonkovich 
v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F 3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff must also 
show that "both public and private actors share a common, unconstitutional goal." Anaya 
v. Crossroads Managed Care sys.f 195 F 3d 584, 596 (10th Cir. 1999). Whether or not 
there is a conspiracy is typically a question of fact. See Gallagher v. Neil Young 
Freedom Concert 49 F.3d 1442, 1448 (10th Cir. 1995); Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar 
Co.2002 UT 69, f^ f 35-36. However, A court may grant summary judgment on an issue 
that is normally a question of fact if no reasonable jury could conclude that fact exists. 
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co.y 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). See also Raab v. 
Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, f 50; White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994); 
Clover v. Snowbird Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah 1991). When a jury would be left 
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to speculation, the action fails as a matter of law. Harline v. Baker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 
(Utah 1996) 
Both civil conspiracy and Section 1983 conspiracy require that the co-conspirators 
have a "meeting of the minds" or agreement, which is the central issue of dispute in this 
case. Plaintiffs argue the circumstantial evidence they have submitted infers a meeting of 
the minds. Although the court must assume Plaintiffs' facts for purposes of summary 
judgment, it does not have to assume any asserted inferences. Holland v. Columbia Iron 
Mining Co., 4 Utah 2d 303, 306 (1956) 
(R. 1260) Inferences are made for the purpose of aiding reason, not to override it. 
Inferences are nothing more than probable or natural explanation of facts." Id. at 306-
307. In this case, the court cannot reasonably infer from the evidence given that there was 
a meeting of the minds. Though circumstantial evidence may by itself support a cause of 
action for conspiracy, the evidence given in this instance is insufficient to provide a jury 
with a reasonable basis for such a finding. Pivotal to the allegation that there was a 
meeting of the minds is the supposed relationship between Deputy Morgan and Tonya 
Houck. Defendants' hostility and Deputy Morgan's haphazard investigation taken 
together prove nothing by themselves, but might support a theory of conspiracy if an 
underlying relationship was shown to exist between the actors. However, no real 
relationship has been shown or even alleged. The only basis upon which the Plaintiffs 
rest their allegation of conspiracy is that the parties are aware that they both work for the 
Utah County Sheriffs Department an agency that employs hundreds of people. The 
depositions of Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck quoted in the motions clearly show that, 
31 
though the parties had heard of each other, they did not know each other personally. The 
Plaintiffs do not dispute this. Thus, evidence in this case is that Tonya Houck and 
Deputy Morgan were just shy of complete strangers. The court cannot reasonably infer 
from this circumstance that a conspiracy existed, and no reasonable jury could believe 
this basis to be sufficient for a finding that there was a meeting of the minds. Therefore, 
Defendants9 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on the Section 1983 conspiracy 
and civil conspiracy claims. (R. 1259) Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' malicious 
prosecution claim is void as a matter of law because simply reporting perceived criminal 
activity cannot qualify as malicious prosecution. According to Smith v. Colorado Sears 
Roebuck 21 Fed. Appx. 796, 801 (10th Or. 2001). The court finds that the plaintiffs' 
1983 malicious prosecution claim cannot survive because plaintiffs have not shown that 
the prosecution was done "under color of state law" as applied to the Houcks. The federal 
statute for malicious prosecution states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation.. .subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to 
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 
law, suit in equity or other proceeding for redress... (.). 
42U.S.C. § 1983. 
In a Section 1983 suit, the plaintiffs have to prove: (1) that there was continued 
confinement or prosecution; (2) that the original action terminated in favor of the 
plaintiff, (3) that there was no probable cause to support the original arrest, continued 
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confinement, or prosecution; (4) that the defendant acted with malice; and (5) that the 
plaintiff sustained damages. Novitsky v.City of Aurora, 491 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 
2007)(quoting Pierce v. Gilchrist 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff must also 
show that the defendant acted "under color of state law", in other words, that the 
defendant participated in joint action with the State or its agents, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 
U.S. 24, 27 (1980). To assert that the arrest was a "state action" in a conclusory allegation 
without a sufficient factual foundation is insufficient, the pleadings must present facts 
tending to show agreement and concerted action. Smith v. Colorado Sears Roebuck, 21 
Fed. Appx 796, 800 (10th Cir. 2001). 
In order to assert a claim of 1983 malicious prosecution with regard to the Houcks, 
plaintiffs must assert facts tending to show agreement and concerted action with Deputy 
Morgan to deprive plaintiffs of a constitutional right. Whether there was an agreement 
and concerted action would typically be a question of fact, as referenced above. However, 
as also aforementioned, this court may grant a motion for summary judgment, 
notwithstanding a question of fact, if no reasonable jury could conclude that fact exists. 
In the previous section, this court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that there 
was a conspiracy or a meeting of the minds between the Houcks and Deputy Morgan 
given the facts alleged by the plaintiffs. Setting aside averments of conspiracy, the only 
evidence that the Houcks acted in concert or agreement with a state actor is their 
complaints to the Utah County Sheriffs Office and Deputy Morgan. However, reporting 
suspected criminal activity or filing a complaint against an individual does not fulfill the 
"under color of state law" requirement of Section 1983. Pinov. Higgs, 73 F.3d 1461, 
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1465 (10th Cir. 1996) (private party reported defendant was engaging in criminal activity, 
Sykes v. California, (R. 1257) 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974) (private party filed a complaint 
against defendant). See also Grow v. Fisher, 523 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1975); Brooks v. 
Peters, 322 F Supp 1273 (DC Wis 1971); Kahermanes v. Marchese, 361 F.Supp. 168 
(DC Pa 1973); Weyandt v. Mason fs Stores, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 283 (DC Pa 1968). Because 
Mr. Pintar's alleged constitutional deprivation was not done under color of state law, the 
plaintiffs cannot sustain their 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Thus, defendants' 
motion for summary judgment on the 1983 malicious prosecution claim is granted. 
Appelee's note: After repeated perceived threats by the Appellants and their two 
sons towards Appellees, the mere number of these incidents, Appellees deemed it 
necessary to contact the authorities for assistance. The government provides civilian 
protection through their law enforcement agencies. Appellees cited their issues with the 
Sheriff Department responding officer, it was only coincidental that on most of the 
occasions Deputy Morgan was the responder. Once the statements were taken by the 
Officer, Appellees were no longer involved, nor did they have input as to what action, if 
any, the authorities undertook. In fact, it came as a complete surprise to hear of 
Appellant Lewis booking. Appellees do not think that it is against the law to ask a law 
enforcement agency for assistance There has been no new evidence, and the laws have 
not changed; so Appellees believe that the Honorable Judge David Mortensen and 
Honorable Judge Gary D. Stott dismissals should be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court should UPHOLD the District Court's 
decisions regarding the following: 
L Second Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution, 
Third Cause of Action for conspiracy, 
As to Utah County; 
2. Second Cause of Action for Malicious Prosecution 
Third Cause of Action for conspiracy 
As to Deputy Morgan; 
3. .Leave To File Proposed Second Amended Complaint 
4. First Cause of Action - Declaratory Relief 
As to the Houcks 
5. Second Cause Of Action for Malicious Prosecution 
Third Cause Of Action for Conspiracy 
Fourth Cause of Action for Civil Conspiracy 
As to the Houcks 
^%£fw£,. Jo / 4 ^ ^ ^ M a r t i n G. Houck, pro se 
Darlene Houck, pro se 
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